This article uses a structural VAR approach to study the different shocks to the monetary performance in the two decades of the U.S. economy prior to the 2008 financial crisis. By using the Federal Fund Rate as a measure of change in monetary policy, the study shows that interest rate expectation is informative about the future movement of Federal Fund Rate and the anticipated monetary policy should be one of the crucial reasons in causing monetary and financial deterioration in the U.S. economy. The article discusses a possible conjecture of a low interest rate trap when a persistent and prolonged low interest rate regime led to financial instability.
I Introduction
Since banks and hedge funds have invested heavily in subprime mortgage backed securities, few have predicted that the U.S. subprime mortgage industry could lead to a worldwide credit crunch when the Fed takeover the two mortgage-based security companies and the closure of Lehman Brothers. Efforts have been made to rescue the subsequent economic collapses (Financial Services Authority, 2009; French et al., 2010; IMF, 2009) . The 2008 crisis has raised the relevance of monetary fundamentals (Taylor and Williams, 2009; Taylor, 2009 ).
Schwartz ( Greenspan's chairmanship (7/1985 to 8/2005 ) of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The practice of a direction-known interest-rate smoothing policy showed a stepwise interest rate trend. It has the advantage of financial stability and certainty, but since it could be anticipated, the Fed could not respond swiftly to shocks, and the resulting inflation variability might have introduced instability and volatility (Bullard and Mitra, 2007; Caplin and Leahy, 1996; Goodhart, 1996; Cecchetti, 1996) . The Fed practiced inflation-targeting and an open acknowledgement for low long-run inflation (Mankiw, 2002; Blinder and Reis, 2005; Goodfriend, 2005; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997) . Monetary discretions made without pre-commitment to future course of action had resulted in uncertainty and time-inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Fischer, 1990; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Bryant et al., 1993 , McCallum, 1988 . The adoption of the Taylor rule called for changes in the Federal Fund Rate in response to changes in the price level, although there were periods of deviation (Taylor, 1993; Yellen, 2004; Mehra and Minton, 2007; Blinder and Reis, 2005; Woodford, 2001) . The personalization of monetary policy (Greenspan put) has led to a belief that stock markets would be saved when it went down but would not intervene to stop it from rising (Miller et al., 2002) . prior to financial crisis in September. A structural VAR approach is used to study monetary shocks in the two decades of the U.S. economy. Section II examines the monetary performance and conjectures a "low interest rate trap" that arises from the prolonged low interest rate regime.
Section III and IV present the empirical methodology and the empirical findings, respectively.
Section V concludes.
II
Monetary Performance and Conjecture Figure 1 shows the performance of ten U.S. variables prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
Real GDP and real investment show the level of economic activities. The monthly real GDP and real investment data are constructed from quarterly data by the state space approach with the monthly industrial production data serving as the interpolator variable, assuming that the interpolation is describable as an AR(1) process. The U.S. recession in the mid-1980s has resulted in prolonged economic weakness with a fall in real GDP and real investment until 1992.
The nominal economic variables include S&P500 and home mortgages; they both were While the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) excludes the price influence of food and energy, the drastic increase in the world price of oil (OPW) has affected the U.S. economy. The inclusion of OPW ensures that the estimation model will not suffer from the 'price puzzle' problem (Sims, 1992 , Sims et al., 1996 Christiano et al., 1996) . The core CPI has increased continuously, and followed closely the OPW trend. The OPW has shown a steady trend in the 1990s, but has increased rapidly since 1999. The FFR trend shows two prolonged low interest rate periods (1993-1995 and 2002-2004) , with a clear downward movement in 1989-1994 when it was lowered from 6% to 1.75% (Lucas, 1981; Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Modigliani, 1977; Barro, 1976 ).
As such, policymakers might think that a further drop in interest rates was needed in order to stimulate investment. It was probable that when the interest rate had reached a very low level, "b", investors would then borrow extensively. The extremely low interest rate now would encourage unproductive, low-return and speculative bubble-prone varieties.
The rapid increase in investment at the low interest rate could produce overheating that called for policy reversal (arrow "c") . The initial reversal in interest rates could even lead to a rise in investment as investors expected higher future borrowing cost. The rise in interest rate would soon lower economic activities. Those who have borrowed at the lowest interest rate at "b"
would now face a repayment problem. By the time the interest rate reached a high level, "d", economic slowdown emerged and the authority would then have to revise the interest rate downward, producing another round of stepwise downward movement in interest rate policy (arrow a', b' and c').
When investors could fully anticipate the interest rate movements, fragile investors would wait until interest rate reached the lowest possible level. For example, home ownership was encouraged during the second term of the Clinton administration. As property prices rise the demand for property also rises as home buyers now feared that property prices would soon rise further. Home buyers without full financial credibility were prepared to hedge against the expected rising property price. The monetary conjecture in Figure 2 shows that the economy could have been "trapped" at the lowest interest rate levels at points b and b', as investors have got used to the low interest rate and monetary authority found it difficult to maintain a higher level of interest rate. A prolonged low interest rate regime could have encouraged financial and property speculations that cumulated to form the roots of a financial bubble. A stepwise interest rate smoothing policy could eventually produce an unsustainable and cyclical form of monetary policy that helped more to fuel financial instability than to build up sustainable economic capacity. The economy was effectively addicted to a low interest rate regime, making financial resources cheap and promoting low-productivity. While the Fed attempted to manage the business cycle, the interest rate policy could have led to a trade-off in sustainable long-run growth. The "low interest rate trap" can be studied using U.S. data to show if interest rate followed a stepwise movement and investors anticipated fully its movement. A structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model (Sims and Zha, 2006; Kim and Roubini, 2000) is used to incorporate the interest rate expectation of investors to show that monetary policy could become ineffective and/or would promote speculation when it is fully anticipated.
The following SVAR system expresses the contemporaneous interactions between the variables in structural form:
where B(L) is a n x n matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L; Y t is a n x 1 vector of variables, and e t is a n x 1 vector structural disturbances which is identical independent normal with var (e t ) =  . The  is a diagonal matrix and the diagonal elements are the variances of structural disturbances such that each structural disturbance can be assigned explicitly to particular equations. Let B 0 be the contemporaneous coefficient matrix on L 0 in the structural form, and
Consider the reduced form VAR equation:
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator, L, and μ t is a vector of reduced-form disturbances with no structural interpretation. Multiply 1 0 B  to the structural form equation:
The parameters of reduced form VAR equation are related to the parameters of the SVAR equation:
The reduced form residuals are related to the structural disturbances:
and its covariance matrix is:
The reduced form residuals become the linear combinations of the structural disturbances.
Equation (7) suggests that the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is not diagonal, and the right hand side of the equation has
( 1) n n   free parameters to be estimated. Since  contains ( 1) / 2 n n   parameters, the parameters in the SVAR equation cannot be identified without restriction. To achieve identification, 
The terms on the LHS of Equation (8) show the six sub-equations in the structural model represent the unobserved structural shocks, while u i,t are the observed residuals obtained from the reduced form of VAR analysis. As oil is imported to the U.S. economy, the first sub-equation assumes that OPW is exogenous to the U.S. economy. The second output sub-equation shows that output responds mainly to OPW shocks. However, it also assumed that CPI, FFR, RH and EX impact on the lag values of output. In order to incorporate the influence of real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages, Equation (8) will be tested in three alternative models with real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages subsequently replacing output in the second subequation. The output, S&P500 and real investment are considered as the dependent variable in each model, and their fluctuation depended on OPW, CPI and so on.
The third sub-equation shows the response of CPI with respect only to output and OPW shocks. In the S&P500 model identification in the second sub-equation, it is assumed that the movement of the S&P500 index return would not result in contemporaneous price level fluctuation. The coefficient estimate of 32 b would become zero. We further assume that the S&P500 index return will contemporaneously respond to the FFR and EX shocks (Ehrmann and Fratzcher, 2004) . A negative relationship between exchange rate and stock return would produce a non-zero coefficient estimate for 24 b and 26 b (Solnik, 1987; Wong and Li, 2010 (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Sims and Zha, 1994) . In forecasting the FFR, Panel B reports the marginal significance levels of consumer confidence index on higher (RH), same (RS) or lower (RL) interest rate in 12 months. Among the three different periods, RH performs better in the second sub-sample period and the whole sample period, as seen from the smaller value of the estimates. The level of statistical significance for RH in the first and second sub-sample periods is 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. RH has shown a higher predictive power in the second sub-sample period than in the first sub-sample period. FFR is used as a monetary policy indicator while RH is the interest rate expectation indicator in the estimation.
IV Empirical Results
We examine from Equation (8) 1989-1999 2000-2008 1989-1999 2000-2008 1989-1999 2000-2008 1989-1999 Importance of interest rate expectation on real output and alternative variables
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) method is used to investigate the contribution of each structural shock in affecting other variables. Table 4 shows that the contribution of FFR (shock 4) and interest rate expectation (shock 5) have significantly increased in the second sub-sample period in most cases, suggesting that their impact on the variance of the real GDP, real investment, and home mortgages in the second sub-sample period was larger than in the first sub-sample period. Hence, when interest rate was low, the FFR and interest rate expectation become more important. In the case of the variance decomposition of real investment, the contribution by CPI (shock 3) and interest rate expectation (shock 5) have outperformed other variables in the second sub-sample period, implying that CPI and interest rate expectation were more important than other variables. The outperformance can be seen from the larger values shown in Table 4 . The significance of CPI was probably due to the high OPW in the second sub-sample period. The significance of interest rate expectation suggested that investors could have anticipated interest rate movement, and acted on their investment decisions accordingly.
For the variance decomposition of S&P500, the contribution of EX (shock 6) is significantly higher than the others, suggesting that the U.S. stock market is heavily influenced by EX. The FEVD analysis demonstrates that the higher contribution on the errors in forecasting real GDP, real investment and home mortgage is due to the variability in the shocks of FFR to an interest rate expectation shock, real GDP responded sharply in the second sub-sample period, while S&P500 responded inversely in both periods. One can conclude that a positive interest rate expectation shock did encourage speculation in the second sub-sample period.
To consider the predictability of investors on the interest rate movement, we examine the dynamic response of interest rate expectation to a positive monetary policy shock, meaning that when investors expected a high interest rate, the Fed would increase the interest rate. Figure 4 shows the estimated impulse response functions of interest rate expectation to a monetary policy shock using the real GDP equation. slightly in the first sub-sample period, but dropped below zero after the fifth month, confirming that contractionary monetary shock did not generate a persistent rise in price level. In Figure 5 Panel B, the price level dropped after the second month, which is consistent with expectation. It is obviously that a contractionary monetary policy shock produced a larger effect in lowering inflation rate in the second sub-sample period. In the case of the exchange rate, no significant effect can be found between the two sub-sample periods.
We next examine the dynamic responses of real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages to a contractionary monetary policy shock (rise in interest rate) ( Figure 6 ). The results of Figure 6 Panel A are expected and consistent. A contractionary monetary policy shock is expected to result in a decrease in real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages. In particular, it has a significant negative effect on real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages in the short run. In Figure 6 Panel B, the responses of real GDP is similar to the first sub-sample period, with a sharply increase in real GDP after the fourth month. In the case of home mortgage, the response in the second sub-sample period is generally larger than that in the first sub-sample period, meaning that an increase in FFR would generate more fluctuation in home mortgage.
Significant difference in the response patterns in real investment and S&P500 could also be found in the second sub-sample period, implying that stock market behaved differently for the same shock in different periods. A sustained increase in real investment and S&P500 could be seen in the first few months in the second sub-sample period in response to a contractionary monetary policy, and the rising trends reached the peak at the sixth month and the third month, respectively, before they both declined. Such a result clearly suggested that investment and stock market speculation were encouraged in the short run by a contractionary monetary policy. Figure 7 shows the accumulated responses of real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and home mortgage to a contractionary monetary policy. A lower accumulated response of real GDP to a contractionary policy shock meant that the increase in FFR would lead to a decrease in GDP.
In the short run, only real investment was promoted in the second sub-sample period. This meant that the increase in FFR would lead to a decrease in real investment. For the S&P500, the accumulated response was higher in the second sub-sample period than in the first sub-sample period. Most notably, the accumulated responses of home mortgages between the two subsample periods changed drastically. The contractionary monetary policy has successfully reduced home mortgages in the first sub-sample period, but has greatly stimulated home mortgages in the second sub-sample period, suggesting that there could be other responsible factors. Similarly, the contractionary monetary policy shock has produced a larger effect in lowering inflation rate in the second sub-sample period. It is reasonable to argue that anticipated monetary policy was the crucial reason in generating the sub-prime mortgage crisis that started in late 2007 and caused further deterioration of the U.S. economy. In short, the increase in interest rate had led to a decrease in CPI and an increase in home mortgage that gave rise to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
VI Conclusion
Interest rate expectation plays an important role in the U.S. economy. During 2000-2008, a positive interest rate expectation shock did not only encourage investment but speculation in the financial markets. Empirical evidence shows that a contractionary monetary policy has overheated real investment though it lowered the price level and output. The response of economic variables to a monetary policy shock may not follow the conventional wisdom when the policy is fully anticipated.
This empirical analysis relates the discussion back to the basics of monetary economics, and in particular, the problem of monetary policy uncertainties (Friedman, 1968; Poole, 1970; Romer and Romer, 1989; Brainard, 1967) . Similar to Friedman's (1948 Friedman's ( , 1960 idea of a constant money supply, it probably would be appropriate for policy makers to pursue an "interest rate anchor" such that the adoption of a steady interest rate allows the business cycle to develop, evolve around or respond to the interest rate rather than changing the interest rate ostensibly to suit the business cycle.
The conjecture of a "low interest rate trap" highlighted a monetary phenomenon that could give rise to unintended economic consequences. It encouraged low-return investment and speculation which were unmatched with economic growth. Investors with full anticipation on the movement of the interest rate could result in a business cycle that built around the policy. It is preferable to have an effective and steady interest rate anchor that allows the business cycle to run its own course and be regulated by private economic activities. The government at most needs to fine tune the "interest rate anchor" should the business cycle deviates from normal.
